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TWO’S A CROWD? IMPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY FOR
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE

Matthew Farrell
Old Dominion University, 2022
Director: Dr. Shaomin Li

ABSTRACT

Although literature on corporate governance and economic geography often explores
similar constructs, theories, and other matters, little work has been done examining their joint
effects. This two-essay dissertation integrates these literatures in order to partially fill this gap
by asking the following research questions:
1.) Do geographic proximity and multiple directorships function as substitutes or
complements?
2.) How is the governance of highly innovative firms affected by the presence of Marshallian
externalities?
While some scholars suggest that multiple directorships lead to board members neglecting
their advisory and monitoring obligations, others have embraced the idea that holding multiple
board seats can benefit both the firm and the director. The nature of the relationship between
multiple directorships and a variety of firm outcomes has remained the subject of theoretical
debates, and findings are often contradictory. Essay 1 offers a possible explanation for these
issues by incorporating the geographically bounded nature of multiple directorships in an
analysis of their effects on firm acquisition activity. Results offer support for a positive
contribution to acquisition performance, with that relationship becoming stronger as geographic
distance between the target and acquirer increases. My findings suggest that multiple
directorships and geographic distance are complements, but substitutes when they overlap with
one another.
Essay 2 reexamines the relationship between corporate governance at the board level and
innovation, examining whether and how agglomeration economies influence these relationships.
Using a sample drawn from the semiconductor industry, I demonstrate that while firms within an
agglomeration configure their governance in a manner consistent with agency theoretic
predictions, more remote firms do the opposite. Thus, this essay extends prior research by
incorporating agglomeration theory into governance, and specifically exploring the ways in
which Marshallian externalities affect intra-firm safeguards against opportunism.
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CHAPTER 1
TWO’S A CROWD? EXPLORING THE PARADOX OF MULTIPLE DIRECTORSHIPS
AND SPATIAL PROXIMITY FROM AN INFORMATION ECONOMICS
PERSPECTIVE

ABSTRACT
For decades, scholars have examined the influence of the quantity of board seats that a firm’s
directors hold. Critically, management and finance scholarship has largely ignored a key insight
from sociological research in that the holding of multiple board seats tends to happen within a
tight geographic perimeter. In this essay, I explore the competing influence of geographic
proximity and multiple directorships. I examine the semiconductor industry across a five year
period and consider their influence on acquisition success. The results indicate that the benefits
accrued to the firm from multiple board appointments are most easily observed at a larger
geographic distance since these phenomena act as substitutes in terms of effects, yet
complements in terms of functional benefits due to the limited reach of geographic proximity.
Multiple directorships are further positively related to acquisition success for firms that acquire
frequently. Implications for theory, practice, and policymaking are discussed.
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Keywords: multiple directorships, interlocks, information economics, spatial proximity,
acquisitions.
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1. INTRODUCTION

Over the past few decades, multiple directorships, which occur when board members serve on
two or more boards (as defined by Ferris, Jagannathan, & Pritchard, 2003), have been the focus
of a great deal of scholarly attention, especially within the fields of both finance (e.g., Perry &
Peyer, 2005; Fich & Shivdasani, 2006; Ferris, Jayaraman, & Liao, 2018, 2020) and strategic
management (e.g., Harris & Shimizu, 2004; Khanna, Jones, & Boivie, 2014; Krause, Wu,
Bruton, & Carter, 2019). That this phenomenon has been researched so extensively is not
surprising. As noted by Davis (1996), interlocks have been found to be related to almost all of
the elements of corporate governance that are of any import - though critics charge that this is in
large part due to the easy availability of the data (Stinchcombe, 1990).
Despite being the subject of a voluminous body of work over a long period of time,
evidence regarding the effect of multiple directorships on a variety of firm outcomes remains
split on both a theoretical and empirical level. Theoretically, some scholars argue that multiple
directorships will prove to be distracting to those who serve on multiple boards, with directors’
attention being too divided to adequately fulfill board duties such as monitoring and resource
provision (e.g., Fich & Shivdasani, 2006). At the same time, others have argued that directors
who serve on multiple boards are likely to have been offered these positions due to their
extensive experience and past success, and as such the presence of these directors is likely to
contribute to firm performance either through superior service (Fama & Jensen, 1983) or by
reflecting positively on the firm’s prestige (cf. Podolny, 2001).
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Some consensus, however, has been reached regarding specific aspects of the
phenomenon. For example, one of the primary benefits of such directorships is the channeling of
important information regarding the firm’s external environment (e.g., Haunschild, 1993; Sarkar
& Sarkar, 2009; Shropshire, 2010; Connelly, Johnson, Tihanyi, & Ellstrand, 2011). Intuitively,
it would be expected that the more such directorships exist, the greater the quantity of
information that flows into the firm (as noted by Haunschild & Beckman, 1998), an expectation
which seems to be consistent with findings such as Boyd’s (1990), who argued and showed that
boards form more interlocks during periods of environmental turbulence in order to better cope
with external resource dependencies, many of which are information-based.
Yet, it has long been noted in sociological research that multiple directorships tend to cooccur within close spatial proximity (Kono, Palmer, Friedland, & Zafonte, 1998), which tends to
have the same effect in terms of reducing information asymmetries. Building on Akerlof’s
(1970) insights regarding the ways in which information asymmetries can adversely affect
markets, researchers have generated a great deal of evidence regarding the effect of geographic
proximity on information asymmetry reduction, with some studies using geographic distance as a
proxy for information asymmetries (e.g., Coval and Moskowitz, 2001; Malloy, 2005; Ragozzino
and Reuer, 2011). That a main benefit of both spatial proximity and multiple directorships is to
introduce novel information to the firm suggests that these mechanisms might substitute for one
another. Why, then, do they tend to occur in geographic clusters?
Given the importance of answering this question on a practical and theoretical level, it is
surprising that this has not been examined. In order to unravel this puzzle, I gathered data on 97
acquisitions of US-based semiconductor firms from 2010 to 2015, since acquisitions are strongly
consequential for firm performance (Haleblian, Devers, McNamara, Carpenter, & Davison,
10
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2009) and typically merit board involvement (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989), carrying the additional
advantage of being more proximal to the board’s influence than more holistic outcomes such as
firm performance. Incorporating insights from spatial economics and corporate governance
literatures, I attempted to demonstrate what the effects of multiple directorships might be when
taking the geographic distance between target and acquiring firms into account.
My findings suggest that they do act as substitutes, but due to the limited reach of spatial
information asymmetry reduction (50 miles at best according to Orlando, 2004), are also
complementary on a functional level, which seems to be consistent with recent work that has
argued for, and found, positive relationships between multiple directorships and international
acquisitions (Xia, Ma, Tong, & Li, 2018; Ahsan, Popli, & Gubbi, 2019; Wang & Peng, 2019).
Further, the experience of directors who hold multiple seats is valuable, as this information can
prevent the mis-application of prior firm experience or routines which frequently cause
acquisitions to fail (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Finkelstein & Haleblian, 2002; Zollo &
Singh, 2004).
In answering the call for strategic management studies which examine the effect of
information asymmetries on acquisition outcomes (Bergh, Ketchen, Orlandi, Heugens, & Boyd,
2019), I was able to develop a study which has a number of implications for management theory
and practice, as well as policy implications. First, there is a heretofore unobserved obfuscation
of the benefits of multiple directorships due to spatial concerns, suggesting that previous studies
which do not account for the reduction of information asymmetries within close quarters may be
seriously misspecified. Second, reduction of information asymmetries at the board level in the
form of experience can bolster the resource provisioning role of boards by providing a variety of
acquisition experiences that can be drawn from to better advise the firm’s management. Third,
11
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practitioners have been cautioned to limit the number of directorships in which their boards can
participate, with numbers of “overboarded” directors trending downwards in recent years in the
face of the disapproval of investors and discouragement within corporate governance codes
(Popadopoulos, 2019). Specific to the US, the National Association of Corporate Directors
(1996) as well as the Council of Institutional Investors (2003) passed resolutions urging limits on
directorships held by directors of public companies. The findings of this and those of other
recent studies suggest that reducing the quantity of directorships held by a firm’s board may not
lead to improvements in performance (through a variety of metrics) or overall corporate
governance quality.
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW

Scholarly work on multiple directorships spans several decades and disciplines,
particularly if interlocking directorships are considered a subset therein. In a literature review,
Mizruchi (1996; p. 271) defines interlocks thusly: “...when a person affiliated with one
organization sits on the board of directors of another organization.” Since this affiliation refers
to the board level, an interlock, by the definition proffered earlier in this paper, constitutes a
multiple directorship. This being the case, a thorough, comprehensive review is well outside of
the scope of this study. I will attempt, however, to outline some of the major findings and
discussions of the past few decades, particularly as they pertain to my research question.
Table 1 provides an overview of scholarly findings regarding multiple directorships
across several different and important subjects. These studies span numerous distinct
institutional environments and encompass many theoretical perspectives, but taken as a whole,
they all provide conflicting evidence related to the outcome in question. For example, some
evidence exists that fast-paced corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities benefit from the
presence of interlocks, which the study’s author attributes to the directors’ social networks (AlDah, 2019). Yet, other scholars, arguing from an agency perspective, found that outside
directors who hold multiple board seats negatively moderate the effect of corporate philanthropy
on firm performance (Su & Sauerwald, 2018).
Broadly, many studies pit the “busyness hypothesis” against the “reputational” or
“experience” hypotheses, which, despite being at loggerheads in terms of their implications, are
also both rooted in agency theory. The busyness hypothesis, as defined by Jiraporn and
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colleagues (2009), holds that directors with too many board appointments will be overextended
in terms of their time commitments. This in turn will lead to shirking at the board level, resulting
in negative outcomes for the firm as a whole. The busyness hypothesis has been tested, and has
found support, in a wide array of studies (e.g., Core, Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999; Shivdasani &
Yermack, 1999; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). For example, Fich and Shivdasani (2006) found
that corporate governance was weaker in firms where the majority of outside directors held more
than three seats. Specifically, firms with busy boards experienced reduced profits, inferior
market-to-book ratios, and a lowered likelihood that under-performing CEOs would be
dismissed. In contrast, the reputational, or “experience” hypothesis, as argued for by Fama and
Jensen (1983), holds that multiple board appointments are clear indicators of a director’s quality
and experience. The reputational hypothesis has also received broad empirical support (e.g.,
Kaplan & Reishus, 1990; Coles & Hoi, 2003; Masulis & Mobbs, 2011). An exemplar study in
this vein is that of Harris and Shimizu (2004), who found, contrary to their expectations, that
directors who held multiple board seats (what they termed “overboarded” directors) tended to
enhance firms’ acquisition performance.
The busyness and reputational hypotheses have been utilized frequently in efforts to
integrate the broad literatures on multiple directorships and acquisition activity (see Peng &
Wang, 2019 for a review), though the results remain contentious. Noting the informational
advantages enjoyed by firms that share directors, some scholars have found positive effects of
multiple directorships in terms of both pre- and post-acquisition success via superior target
selection and post-acquisition integration (Cai & Sevilir, 2012; Renneboog & Zhao, 2014).
Other scholars have argued for the busyness hypothesis and found support for their claims
(Jiraporn, Kim, & Davidson, 2008), as firms with multiple directorships tend to face relatively
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high diversification discounts, particularly when the quantity of such directorships reaches a
particular threshold (Ahn, Jiraporn, & Kim, 2010).
Despite these diversification discount arguments, there are other factors at play that may
positively influence acquisition outcomes when multiple directorships are involved. For
example, several studies examine the importance of director experience in achieving acquisition
success (e.g., McDonald, Westphal, & Graebner, 2008; Harford & Schonlau, 2013; Field &
Mkrtchyan, 2017), and that directors who hold multiple board seats are highly likely to have
more experience has been observed in several studies (e.g., Fama & Jensen, 1983; Viviers &
Mans-Kemp, 2019). In finding a positive relationship between multiple directors and acquisition
success, Harris and Shimizu (2004) offered as a possible explanation that holders of several
board seats may simply be more efficient than others as a consequence of this experience,
allowing them to discharge their duties despite having relatively less time than directors who do
not serve elsewhere.
The positive influence of geographic proximity on acquisition success has been less
controversial, even when the distinct, but often overlapping influence of agglomeration
economies (e.g., Marshall, 1920; Porter, 1990) is accounted for. Prior scholarship has argued
that geographic proximity should play a role even within an agglomeration (Pouder & St. John,
1996; McCann et al., 2016) due to the increased salience of the available information and to
firms’ increased absorptive capacity in terms of assimilating information from nearby firms.
Further, although agglomeration economies are often defined by their limited geographic scope
(Rosenthal & Strange, 2001; Orlando, 2004), there are other factors at play that influence the
spread of information therein. That is, proximity does not imply a cluster-level architectural
knowledge or the development of common, cluster-level norms (Storper, 1995; Tallman,
15
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Jenkins, Henry, & Pinch, 2004; Arikan, 2009), although proximate (but not agglomerated) firms
may also benefit from reduced information asymmetries through some of the same mechanisms
(e.g., a shared labor pool, both formal and informal interactions among customers and suppliers,
or new organizations emerging from parent firms as noted by Keeble and Wilkinson (1999)).
There are other advantages of geographic proximity in abetting acquisition success, too.
As noted by Grote and Umber (2006), it becomes easier to integrate an acquired firm when it is
more proximate due to relatively lower transportation costs for both goods and workers. Second,
geographic proximity facilitates monitoring of managers or firm sub-units, as evidenced by
findings regarding nearby subsidiaries (Bockerman & Lehto, 2003) or VC firms (Lerner, 1995;
Sorenson & Stuart, 2001; Zook, 2002). Finally, proximity influences information quality.
Several studies (e.g., Daft & Lengel, 1986; Storper & Venables, 2004) note the benefits of
transmitting information face-to-face versus some other medium, and Malloy (2005), for
example, found that geographically proximate analysts have more accurate forecasts than their
peers due to the higher-quality information and ease of tacit knowledge exchange that is
available in close proximity.
All of the advantages outlined above may explain the consistent support that geographic
proximity has displayed regarding acquisition success. Given that information availability
increases the likelihood of acquisitions occurring (McCann et al., 2016) and that geographic
proximity increases such availability (Coval & Moskowitz, 1999; Petersen & Rajan, 2002), it is
small wonder that many studies note its importance in the literature (e.g., Chakrabarti &
Mitchell, 2013, 2016; Rabier, 2017).
The meaning of what makes an acquisition successful is more subjective. As described
by Nadolska and Barkema (2014), motives for acquisitions can include increasing the scope of
16
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the organization, organizational learning, market entry (or competitor pre-emption), and
achieving scale economies. This, combined with the difficulty inherent in assessing what a
firm’s performance might have been had the acquisition not taken place, complicates the use of
accounting measures or cumulative abnormal returns, though some studies have utilized them
anyway (e.g., Morosini, Shane, & Singh, 1998; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Pangarkar & Lie,
2004). Perceptual measures of acquisition success have also been employed by some scholars,
though these may be subject to difficulties inherent in using survey data (Haleblian et al., 2009)
such as monomethods and recall biases. Retention of the acquired firm is also a common
measure (e.g., Shaver, Mitchell, & Yeung, 1997; Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001; Hebert, Very, &
Beamish, 2005). Although firm survival must be carefully interpreted, scholars have found a
positive relationship between it and perceived success of a business (Geringer & Hebert, 1991),
while divestments are often instigated by poor growth in sales or financial underperformance
(Bethel & Liebeskind, 1993; Mitchell & Singh, 1993)

HYPOTHESES

There are several reasons to predict that the influence of geographic proximity is stronger
than that of multiple directorships in achieving acquisition success, and not only in light of the
disparity in empirical support displayed in the literature review for each. First, geographic
proximity extends not only to the board but to all levels of the organization’s headquarters,
increasing the availability of information regarding a target’s resources and capabilities. This
increase across organizational levels should be beneficial, as shown by prior research. For
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example, several studies have noted the importance of middle management in strategy formation
(e.g., Wooldridge & Floyd, 1990), and implementation (Huy, 2011); additionally their support
may be crucial to acquisition success since they are more severely impacted by acquisition
activity (Fried, Tiegs, Naughton, & Ashforth, 1996). It follows that information regarding
positive qualities of the target will lead to greater likelihood of an acquisition, or avoiding one
altogether if it is a poor fit.
Second, there is an increased availability of tacit knowledge regarding acquisition targets
in close proximity that is typically not available at long distances (Coval & Moskowitz, 1999;
Grote & Umber, 2006), facilitating the post-acquisition integration that is critical for acquisition
success in technology firms such as those in my sample (Ranft & Lord, 2002; Puranam, Singh, &
Zollo, 2006). For instance, in examining factors specific to high technology industries, Ranft
and Lord (2000) proposed that richer communication between an acquirer and target during the
acquisition process should maintain the value of technologies for which the target was acquired.
Finally, acquirers are more likely to be involved in firm governance choices such as
replacing poorly-performing managers when a target is proximate geographically (Kang & Kim,
2008). This implies that board functions such as monitoring are weaker with greater distance, a
finding which is supported by some studies. For instance, banks face higher transportation costs
in assessing the qualities of loan applicants or in monitoring loans, which can be reflected in the
terms of the loan (Petersen & Rajan, 1995; Sussman & Zeira, 1995). In the context of
manufacturing firms, proximity of headquarters to production facilities lowers communication
and monitoring costs (Henderson & Ono, 2008). Kalnins and Lafontaine (2013) also attribute
higher failure rates of firms that have distant headquarters to monitoring costs and localized
information asymmetries.
18
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Taken together, I argue that measuring proximity may also capture the most efficacious
governance effects. Further, the more rich quality of the transfer of information across multiple
levels of the organization should facilitate successful acquisition outcomes. I posit:

Hypothesis 1: The positive effect of geographic proximity on acquisition success will
be greater than the effect of multiple directorships.

While they may be most effective within closer geographic proximity, I expect that the
effect of multiple directorships will remain positive, and their effects will become more apparent
in cases where appreciable distance exists between targets and acquirers. They should remain
positive in part since director expertise in performing acquisitions is highly valuable. For
instance, prior research has indicated that directors’ expertise in product markets and in
relatedness to the firm’s primary line of business is positively related to acquisition performance
(McDonald, Westphal, & Graebner, 2008). Similarly, Harford and Schonlau (2013) discovered
that CEOs with both value-creating and value-destroying acquisition experiences still
experienced positive and significant outcomes in the directorial labor market, implying that such
experience is highly valuable for firms. Field and Mkrtchyan (2017) found similar results,
stating that board acquisition experience was positively related to subsequent acquisition
performance, although they disputed that poor previous acquisition performance would be
helpful.
Some evidence exists that this expertise can be accessed and/or spread through multiple
directorships. For example, Haunschild (1993) found evidence that while information regarding
19
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acquisition opportunities were not disseminated through interlocks, general know-how and
normative information were. It is intuitive, however, to predict that opportunities might be
transmitted through these channels. Private information about a target may lead managers to
execute an acquisition if their information is superior to that of other firms (Bradley, Desai, &
Kim, 1983), and we can presume that there is a positive relationship between the odds of getting
this “better” information and the number of boards on which a director sits (Haunschild, 1993).
Although Haunschild did not find evidence of opportunity transmission through interlocks
(which are only a two-way tie), empirical support for this idea has been found in other work that
examines more broad conceptions of board busyness. Specifically, multiple directorships,
especially when a director sits on the boards of both firms, can be valuable in reducing
information asymmetries between the acquirer and the target (Cai & Sevilir, 2012; Cukurova,
2012), since fit can be assessed and richer information regarding the target is more readily
available.
In sum, prior research has found mixed results regarding the benefits of multiple
directorships through an agency lens; however, both abductive reasoning and information
economics suggest that they are beneficial to firm outcomes, and these benefits should become
more apparent over the distances between targets and acquirers. I thus posit:

Hypothesis 2: As geographic distance between the target and acquirer increases, the
positive effect of busy directors on acquisition success also increases.
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When firms are serial acquirers, I expect that multiple directorships will prove especially
valuable in advising upper management. This expectation is also rooted in the reduction of
information asymmetries. Often, firms experience poor acquisition outcomes, even having had
past successes, because they mis-apply learning or routines from previous acquisitions
(Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Finkelstein & Haleblian, 2002; Zollo & Singh, 2004). Holders
of multiple directorships are typically more experienced; it stands to reason that a greater
repository of acquisition experience in the boardroom indicates a greater likelihood that the
board has encountered this phenomenon previously.
Further, having served on the boards of several firms, busier directors are more likely to
avoid simply duplicating previous, firm-specific routines since their experience is by definition
spread across multiple firms. This argument is also consistent with prior studies that have
demonstrated a positive relationship between directorial experience and acquisition success (e.g.,
McDonald, Westphal, & Graebner, 2008; Field & Mkrtchyan, 2017).
Finally, the positive relationship between busier directors and serial acquirers should be
bolstered by another causal direction, also. Specifically, a series of successful acquisitions is
likely to enable firms to attract or retain highly skilled and experienced directors, who in many
cases hold multiple board appointments.
To summarize, a greater quantity of multiple directorships should allow the firm to
resolve information asymmetries in terms of their own managers’ experiences and knowledge. I
submit:
Hypothesis 3: Multiple directorships positively moderate the relationship between
acquisition experience and acquisition success.
21
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3. METHODOLOGY

Sample and Data

The sample consists of 97 acquisitions in the semiconductor industry (SIC code 3674) from 2010
to 2015. The semiconductor industry was selected since it has been used in management
research that studies spatial phenomena (e.g., Almeida & Kogut, 1999; Rosenkopf & Almeida,
2003), acquisition success (e.g., Kapoor & Lim, 2007; Phene, Tallman, & Almeida, 2012), and
both (e.g., McCann et al., 2016), so it is uniquely suited to the task of joining the two streams of
research. All acquisitions and related data were drawn from CompuStat. Information regarding
firm directors, their other directorships, and firm headquarter locations were manually pulled
from DEF 14A reports from the SEC and, where possible, corroborated by data from directors’
LinkedIn accounts and CrunchBase. Finally, the data regarding acquirer diversification were
drawn from SDC Platinum. Due to the relatively small size of the sample, means were imputed
where data was missing. All continuous variables were Winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentile
levels to reduce the impact of outliers.

Variables
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3.1 Dependent Variable: Following prior research, I operationalized acquisition success
as being whether the acquisition was retained (coded as ‘1’) or divested (coded as ‘0’) after a 5
year period (e.g., Bergh, 2001; Delios & Beamish, 2001; Nadolska & Barkema, 2014). While
financial performance is often used as an indicator of financial success, there are a plethora of
other potential motivations to acquire, including organizational learning, strategic reorientation,
and entry into new markets. It is also difficult to evaluate what the firm’s performance might
have been had the acquisition not occurred, and to what degree the acquisition drove
performance in any particular case.
3.2 Independent Variables: I calculated the straight-line geographic distance between
the target and acquiring firm headquarters using Google’s API. Although colocation of various
branches of the firms in question could reduce information asymmetries, it has been found that
plant-level managers are not frequently involved in decisions such as acquisitions (Grote &
Umber, 2006). This being the case, I opted to use the distance between headquarters following
prior research (e.g., Malloy, 2005; Ragozzino & Reuer, 2011; Belderbos, Du, & Goerzen, 2017).
Multiple directorships was operationalized following Perry and Peyer (2005), with a
count of the total number of directors on the board with public and/or privately-held firm
directorships, omitting nonprofit and other board service. This carries the benefit of including
board experience which may confer knowledge regarding acquisitions or related for-profit
activities.
I used the natural log of distance in calculating the interaction between geographic
distance and multiple directorships in order to keep all variance inflation factors below the
recommended threshold of 3 to alleviate multicollinearity concerns.
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3.3 Control Variables: I controlled for a variety of factors that might affect firm
acquisition success. Companies that acquire frequently may have gleaned experience that either
enhances their management of the acquired firm or the process itself. This being the case, I
controlled for the quantity of recent acquisitions a firm had made. Specifically, I operationalized
this as the number of acquisitions in the past 3 years (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Bergh,
2001). I also controlled for acquirer diversification, or the number of industries that the
acquiring firm operated within. Since diversified firms are potentially more likely to acquire
related firms than focused firms are (Mitchell & Shaver, 2003), this variable accounts for
differences in their respective behaviors.
Some financial measures of the acquiring firms were also important to include. For
example, since the capital structure of acquiring firms has been shown in prior literature to
influence the choice of target, market value of acquisitions, and returns to the acquirer (Bruner,
1988), I measured acquirer debt as the firm’s debt (in millions of dollars) following many of the
studies examined in King, Wang, Samimi, and Cortes (2020). Further, acquirer performance is
often accounted for in studies that examine acquisitions (e.g., Haunschild & Beckman 1998, de
Sousa Barros, Cardenas, & Mendes-da-Silva, 2020) to reflect empire-building and other
perceived managerial tendencies (Eisenhardt, 1989). I measured acquirer performance using the
acquirer’s yearly return on assets (ROA) following Bettinazzi and Zollo (2017).
I also controlled for size-related factors. The acquisition of a much smaller target should,
ceteris paribus, exert less influence on acquisition performance than the acquisition of a larger
one. As such, I controlled for this using the quotient of target and acquirer size following prior
literature (e.g., Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Harris & Shimizu, 2004), measuring size using
the number of firm employees with the variable size ratio. I also controlled for board size since
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directors serving on larger boards are likely to hold more directorships (as noted in Ferris et al.,
2003). Further, board size has been the subject of some discussion in the literature, much of it
related to acquisitions and decision-making (see Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1999 for a
meta-analytic review). Since target distress can affect acquisition performance (Kusewitt, 1985;
Weitzel & Jonsson, 1989; Bruton, Oviatt, & White, 1994), I also included target performance
measured as the target firm’s ROA. Finally, larger deals tend to be more complex, which in turn
affects the relationships of interest in the study. As such, I controlled for this using the total
dollar value, or deal value, of the transaction (Harris & Shimizu, 2004).

3.4 Results

Given that my dependent variable (acquisition success) was binary, I opted to use logistic
regressions to test my hypotheses. I used clustered standard errors. Table 1 shows descriptive
statistics of the variables, and table 2 contains the correlation matrix. Each variable was tested
for multicollinearity, but all variance inflation factors were below the recommended threshold of
3, suggesting that multicollinearity was not a concern.
Table 3 provides the results of the tests of my hypotheses. Model 1 contains only control
variables. Interestingly, acquisition experience is strongly and significantly negative, which is
consistent with prior research that has failed to find a positive effect of firm-level experience on
desirable outcomes, possibly due to poor codification of acquisition know-how or the lack of
applicability of prior knowledge (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Finkelstein & Haleblian, 2002;
Zollo & Singh, 2004).
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Model 2 incorporates all of the control variables and adds geographic distance, while
Model 3 incorporates the impact of multiple directorships. The coefficient is smaller for
multiple directorships and only weakly significant at the .1 level, which is consistent with
hypothesis 1. Model 4 tests hypothesis 2 by adding the interaction effect between geographic
distance and multiple directorships. This is significant and positive, supporting hypothesis 2,
which stated that multiple directorships would be more beneficial for geographically distant
acquisitions. In Model 5, I tested the interaction effect between multiple directorships and recent
acquisition experience. The result was significant and positive, supporting hypothesis 3, which
stated that multiple directorships would be beneficial for serial acquirers. Model 6 presents the
full model.
As argued by Hoetker (2007), it is important to examine marginal effects in addition to
the significance of coefficients in logistic regressions. My marginal effects analysis was run at
the means and is depicted in the correlation matrix.
My results are qualitatively unchanged when probit or linear probability models are used.
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4. DISCUSSION

Scholars have frequently examined the phenomenon of multiple directorships through a
dichotomous agency perspective - either directors are self-motivated to assume too many board
seats, and consequently offer low quality service, or their superior experience and qualifications
enable them to discharge their duties in a competent fashion, with maintenance of their good
reputations motivating them to perform well. In incorporating spatial economics, I have
demonstrated some support for the reputational hypothesis, with the important caveat that
geographic distance between targets and acquirers is a boundary condition due to substitutional
effects. Although prior research has long observed that multiple directorships are a spatial
phenomenon (Kono et al., 1998), this insight has not, to my knowledge, been incorporated in the
large body of research over the intervening period, nor has it been tested as it relates to corporate
governance concerns. Further, the positive effect of multiple directorships can potentially
ameliorate the negative effects of acquisition experience through enhancing the board’s resource
provision capabilities. Specifically, more experienced directors are better able to avoid the misapplication of prior acquisition experience and routines that drive acquisition failure, making
“overboarded” directors particularly valuable for firms that acquire frequently.
The results of this study are consistent with recommendations of governance scholars
who argue in favor of examining mechanisms as they operate in tandem rather than in isolation
(e.g., Misangyi & Acharya, 2014). Information asymmetries lie at the root of agency, transaction
cost, resource-based, and other major theories frequently used in management (Bergh et al.,
2019); this being the case, future research might profit from close examination of substitutive
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and complementary effects between mechanisms that reduce such asymmetries in order to
enhance the predictive accuracy of the theoretical perspective that is employed.
Specific to this study, I argued and found evidence to the effect that multiple
directorships are more beneficial than previous research has shown due to a dearth of attention to
spatial considerations. The lack of statistical significance for the effect of multiple directorships
on acquisition success on its own may actually strengthen this case inasmuch as that when
geographic proximity’s effects are not accounted for, benefits of multiple directorships which
accrue to the firm often go unrecognized.
Interestingly, my results also have implications for the debate surrounding the effect of
prior experience on merger and acquisition outcomes. Prior research has been inconclusive on
this point. While some studies show that skills in performing acquisitions can be built with
experience (Fowler & Schmidt, 1989; Hitt, Harrison, Ireland, & Best, 1998), others find prior
experience is prone to being poorly applied (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Zollo & Singh,
2004) or that its positive effects depend on characteristics of the top management team
(Nadolska & Barkema, 2014). Regrettably, it is beyond the scope of this study to establish the
exact reason. The result may be an artifact of my operationalization of acquisition success as it
echoes findings in other studies which measure such success in the same way (e.g., Bergh, 2001;
Delios & Beamish, 2001; Nadolska & Barkema, 2014).
My study is not without limitations. For example, board involvement was not measured
despite being critical to my arguments, and to firm outcomes (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992; Judge &
Talaulicar, 2017). It was simply assumed, since it has been noted in the literature that board
involvement peaks at critical junctures such as acquisitions (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989). Further,
I did not take into account the relative size of the firms that directors were tied to, which can be
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used as a proxy for their skill given that monitoring larger firms should be more difficult (Rubin
& Segal, 2019). Another limitation was that I did not establish the direction of causality
regarding multiple directorships and serial acquirers in an empirical sense. That is, while
multiple directorships may be useful in achieving acquisition success for the reasons outlined, it
might also be the case that successful acquisitions result in larger, more prestigious firms, who in
turn are more attractive for directors to join.
My results offer several possible avenues for future research. One suggestion might be to
examine the locales in which multiple directors are situated. A more detailed network analysis
might indicate that directors with homogeneous ties to external information, or similar
experiences in performing acquisitions, equates to redundancies that add little value. Relatedly,
multiple directorships across several agglomerations could potentially lead to the ability to
access a wide variety of cluster-level competencies or knowledge (Lawson, 1997; Tallman et al.,
2004), which could be highly beneficial for firm outcomes such as innovation or performance.
There is also an inherent selection bias at play in that some firms may opt to forego M&A
activity entirely due to the potential for value destruction (see Bruner, 2002 for a detailed
review). As such, further explorations of different dependent variables would be ideal.
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CHAPTER 2
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, AGGLOMERATIONS, AND INNOVATION

ABSTRACT
Although much prior research has focused on leadership structures and the composition of
boards of directors, it is difficult to predict how the deployment of these characteristics might be
affected by the presence of agglomeration economies. Joining the literatures on the topics of
corporate governance and Marshallian externalities, we utilize fuzzy set qualitative comparative
analysis in order to determine how these factors might act in concert. Our findings broadly
indicate that while predictions rooted in an agency perspective are largely valid for agglomerated
firms, highly innovative firms which are more geographically remote tend to utilize a dual CEO,
appoint a preponderance of inside directors, and diversify into a broad range of industries.
Implications for theory and practice are discussed.
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1. INTRODUCTION

Building on insights stemming from the separation of ownership of a firm and control
(e.g., Bearle & Means, 1935), scholars have identified one crucial role of the board of directors
as managerial oversight (i.e., monitoring) in order to curtail managerial opportunism (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983). In order to act as effective monitors, directors on the
board may require attributes that facilitate impartiality and curb conflicts of interest (Eisenhardt,
1989; Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003). This can be of particular importance in hightechnology industries, where innovation imposes additional agency costs by increasing the gap
between innovator and investor knowledge (cf. Zahra, 1996). Consequently, much corporate
governance scholarship has placed emphasis on board attributes that facilitate monitoring of
management, such as employing directors who are independent of the firm (e.g., Fama, 1980)
and the separation of the CEO and board chair roles (e.g., Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994). Yet,
empirical support for the agency perspective remains inconsistent despite a strong theoretical
basis for the idea that these attributes should curb opportunism and thereby enhance firm
outcomes such as innovation (e.g., Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; Krause, Semadeni,
& Cannella, 2014; Boivie, Bednar, Aguilera, & Andrus, 2016).
Given this lack of consistency in the literature, many scholars have moved beyond
examining a direct relationship between board attributes and outcomes and have examined
institutional (e.g., Chen, Peng, & Saparito, 2002) or contextual factors (e.g., Coff, 2003) that
might influence managerial opportunism. One example of such a context is economic
geography. Economic geography scholarship has also examined the effect of managerial
opportunism on firm outcomes as well as how it can be relatively constrained or enabled by the
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presence of “clusters,” or “agglomerations,” which are characterized by the collocation of firms
within the same industry (Marshall, 1920; Porter, 1998). Although clustering should influence
opportunism, the direction of that effect is also the subject of some debate. Some studies hold
that opportunism should be relatively constrained in clusters due to social factors such as trust
(Hervas-Oliver, Lleo, & Cervello, 2007; Bonte, 2008), market characteristics (Helsley &
Strange, 2007), or social sanctions (Diez-Vial & Alvarez-Suescun, 2011), while others contend
and find that firms in clusters are prone to knowledge appropriation concerns (Shaver & Flyer,
2000) and that monitoring mechanisms such as formal contract provisions might be more
important in an agglomerated context in order to prevent such “spillovers” (Devarakonda,
McCann, & Reuer, 2018).
Given the relative lack of cross-pollination between corporate governance and
agglomeration literature, while it is clear that both board attributes and clustering can affect
opportunistic behavior, guidance is limited for theorists and practitioners as to how they might
act in concert. In this study, we aim to help bridge this gap by asking, “How is the governance
of highly innovative firms affected by the presence of Marshallian externalities?” In order to
answer this question, we employ a neoconfigurational approach (Misangyi, Greckhamer, Furnari,
Fiss, Crilly, & Aguilera, 2017) that allows us to examine how these factors operate in
tandem. Specifically, we identify ways in which successful firms deploy governance
mechanisms in the face of agency costs, substituting or complementing them for each other to
reach multiple pathways to innovation.
Given the difficulty in ascertaining ex ante the manner in which these causal conditions
might combine to produce successful innovation outcomes as well as the possibility of causal
asymmetry (i.e., the idea that some factors which lead to innovation success might also lead to
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failure), we utilized fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA), a set-theoretic technique
that permits the researcher to examine multiple configurations of attributes that lead to high (and
low) innovation performance on a consistent basis. Our results indicate that non-diversified
agglomerated firms tend to do well with a greater percentage of outside directors on the board,
whereas firms that are more geographically remote defy the expectations of an agency theoretic
lens, utilizing a dual CEO, a relatively low proportion of outside directors, and high levels of
factors which increase agency costs (i.e., diversification and R&D spending) to obtain superior
innovative outcomes. This technique is well-suited for our research question since it allows us to
refine and extend prior research regarding the manner in which these causal conditions promote
innovation success.
Our study contributes to theory by establishing an important boundary condition to
agency prescriptions that have characterized much corporate governance research, namely that
firms in an industry can obtain competitive advantage through the lower monitoring costs which
agglomerations facilitate. At the same time, more remote firms should not attempt to compete in
a similar fashion, as they will face higher monitoring costs and a reduced threat of knowledge
spillovers. Finally, our results are consistent with some studies (e.g., Boyd, 1995; He & Wang,
2009; Krause, Semadeni, & Canella, 2014) which hold that CEO duality is a complicated
phenomenon whose contribution to firm outcomes can vary depending upon both external and
internal conditions. Given the dramatic difference between successful governance
configurations for agglomerated and non-agglomerated firms, it may be the case that prior
governance research which has not accounted for agglomeration effects has been misspecified.
We also extend agglomeration literature, specifically as it pertains to opportunism. While
we do not directly answer the question of whether clusters mitigate or enable opportunism, we do
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note that firms in close proximity to competitors tend to deploy more intra-firm safeguards
against it, an observation which is consistent with prior research on inter-firm collaborations
within clusters (Devarakonda et al., 2018).
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW

In management research, scholars have frequently examined the implications of
agglomeration economies as they pertain to firm outcomes, in industries such as semiconductors
(Saxenian, 1994; Almeida & Kogut, 1999; Rosenkopf & Almeida, 2003), biotechnology (Folta,
Cooper, & Baik, 2006; Casper, 2007; McCann & Folta, 2011), or hotels (Chung & Kalnins,
2001; Kalnins & Chung, 2004; Canina, Enz, & Harrison, 2005). These externalities tend to
provide local firms with advantages in terms of cost, productivity, and innovation, although
scholarly consensus as to their effects on firm performance is decidedly weaker (see Mathias et
al., 2020 for a meta-analytic review).
This literature is rooted in the work of Marshall (1920), who offered three possible
explanations (beyond geographic proximity of production factors) for improved firm outcomes
within agglomerations. First, sharing of suppliers can result in benefits such as internal scale
economies. Second, labor market pooling permits specific matches between employee skills and
employers’ demand for those skills, which decreases risk for both parties. Third, knowledge
spillovers tend to occur within localized industries, allowing the exchange and recombination of
knowledge. These characteristics tend to positively affect regional wages, productivity, and
economic growth (Rosenthal & Strange, 2004).
Such impacts can also extend beyond innovation, performance, or other factors identified
by previous studies. As an example, geographic proximity, a characteristic of agglomerations,
reduces information asymmetries between parties to the extent that it has served as a proxy for
reduction of information asymmetry in prior research (e.g., Ragozzino, 2009; Ragozzino &
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Reuer, 2011). Given that information asymmetry plays a significant role in several prominent
theoretical perspectives (Bergh, Ketchen, Orlandi, Heugens, & Boyd, 2019), including those
commonly employed in corporate governance research such as agency or resource dependence
theory (e.g., Hillman & Dalziel, 2003), we contend that the degree of industry agglomeration
should affect the monitoring costs of a firm and consequently, the configuration of various
elements of a firm’s board of directors.

Cluster-level Constraints on Opportunism

Supporting this contention, a sizable body of work suggests that opportunism should be
limited within agglomerations. The reasons are, broadly, threefold. First, geographic proximity
tends to facilitate monitoring, which in turn reduces principal-agent conflicts. Second,
monitoring costs should be lower within agglomerations for other reasons, too. For example,
social interactions and networks can facilitate monitoring activities and discourage opportunistic
behaviors. Finally, organization- or industry-level factors such as thicker input markets should,
ceteris paribus, provide suppliers with a certain degree of protection against opportunism.
Below, we discuss each of these elements in turn.

Geographic Proximity and Monitoring
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That geographic proximity facilitates monitoring is not novel - indeed, North (1989)
notes that distance between the Spanish monarchy and their colonies exacerbated the problem of
monitoring agents abroad. More recent studies have argued and found similar results. For
example, Sussman and Zeira (1995) developed a model in which banks face monitoring costs
that increase with distance, and later empirical studies had findings that were consistent with this
model (e.g., Peterson & Rajan, 2002; Degryse & Ongena, 2005). Other investors, such as
blockholders (i.e., those who hold 5 percent or more of a company’s outstanding shares) have
also been shown to prefer targets within a close vicinity due to informational advantages, of
which ease of monitoring is a significant factor (Kang & Kim, 2008).
Much of the evidence regarding geographic proximity and monitoring comes from
studies that examine venture capital firms and their investments. The logic underlying these
findings is fairly straightforward. That is, a venture capital firm’s monitoring and advising role
for firms in their portfolio tends to involve frequent visitation. Monitoring and advising
consumes about half of a venture capitalist’s time, and their time spent onsite at firms in their
portfolio is typically anywhere from 4 to 5 hours per month (if they are playing a leading role in
the investment) or at least once per quarter if another firm is leading the investment (Gorman &
Sahlman, 1989). As a consequence, venture capitalists tend to invest in geographically
proximate firms in order to minimize the cost of their involvement (Gompers & Lerner, 1999).
This finding has been repeated even in industries which, in theory, should be independent of
geography, such as internet-based firms (Zook, 2002).
One example of the importance of geographic propinquity in venture capital monitoring
is found in the work of Lerner (1995), who found that venture capital representation on the
boards of private biotechnology firms in their portfolios was greater when the need for
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monitoring also increased, and that the need for monitoring was higher with greater geographic
distance. These findings are in accordance with the predictions of Fama and Jensen (1983) and
Williamson (1983), who contend that board composition will align with the need for oversight.
Specifically, they note that outside directors should have greater representation when managers
are more likely to pursue self-interest at the expense of shareholders. Lerner (1995) extended
this argument to venture capital firms, arguing and finding that if venture capitalists are effective
monitors, they should have greater representation on boards when additional oversight is
necessary.
This finding is comparable to those of Sorenson and Stuart (2001), who explored the
effects of geographic propinquity on venture capital monitoring as well as moderating factors.
The authors found that, as expected, venture capital firms tended to invest in nearby prospects,
though prior experience with syndicated investments meant that they would be more likely to
invest in an opportunity when a trusted partner was involved. Venture capital experience within
an industry widened the geographic area in which they might invest, as did general investment
experience and venture capital firm network centrality.

Other Factors Which Affect Monitoring Within Clusters

Other studies contend that monitoring costs are lower within clusters, which should lead
to increased monitoring (Burkart et al., 1997). Firms in clusters also have access to superior
information (Porter, 1990; Bianchi & Bellini, 1991; Pouder & St. John, 1996) through factors
such as chance meetings between firm executives facilitated by geographic proximity (Saxenian,
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1994), and some evidence suggests that such common knowledge that is accessible to cluster
members (e.g., Geroski, 1995) includes information that might be relevant to monitoring.
For example, several studies have found that frequent face-to-face interactions, which
often occur within agglomerations (e.g., Marshall, 1920; Porter, 1998), reduce the need for
formal monitoring. In their study of young, technology-based firms in the United Kingdom, YliRenko and colleagues (2001) argued and found that frequent social interactions led to higher
levels of product innovation, in part because these interactions reduced the perception of the
necessity of monitoring, allowing relationships to focus on information processing and
knowledge exchange. Catalini (2018), in a study of university scientists, noted that the
monitoring facilitated by physical proximity allowed parties to lower joint execution costs.
Extending this logic to regional economies, Laursen, Masciarelli, and Principe (2012) argued and
found that product innovations, driven in part by reduced monitoring costs, were more
effectively bolstered by externally acquired R&D.
Another mechanism by which face-to-face interactions partially obviate formal
monitoring requirements is trust. Trust reduces the need for formal monitoring (Dyer & Singh,
1998); the creation of trust is greatly facilitated by proximity and face-to-face interactions
(Dupuy & Torre, 2006) and may be necessary for clusters to be effective (Mesquita, 2007). At
the cluster level, prior research has shown that trust between firms within a cluster is greater than
that between more geographically distant firms. For example, in the context of German
aeronautical companies, knowledge spillovers and agglomerations were found to be positively
associated with trust, albeit negatively moderated by appropriability problems (Bonte, 2007).
Other studies have argued for, and found, an inverted U-shaped relationship between trust and
innovation performance in clusters, contending that time and effort which engenders strong
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levels of trust could instead be directed towards monitoring of a relationship and/or forging new
professional relationships with other firms (Molina-Morales & Martinez-Fernandez, 2009).
Social networks also constrain opportunism (Granovetter, 1985); and although these networks
are distinct from clusters, their effects often overlap (see for example Bell, 2005 for a detailed
disaggregation of these effects).

Vertical Disintegration Within Clusters

Constraints on opportunism within agglomerations are further argued to be reflected
within organizational forms (although some studies attribute this to cost-reduction factors rather
than a reduction in opportunism, e.g., Goldstein & Gronberg, 1984; Holmes, 1999). For
example, Helsley and Strange (2007) develop a model wherein agglomerated firms are less likely
to vertically integrate thanks to thicker input markets, which consequently mitigate the threat of
opportunism.
This finding has also held in empirical studies which show that agglomerated firms are
more likely to externalize transactions rather than vertically integrate them thanks to scale
economies, property rights concerns, or the reduced likelihood of opportunism within a shared
social milieu (Cainelli & Iacobucci, 2009; Figueiredo, Guimaraes, & Woodward, 2010; DiezVial & Alvarez-Suescun, 2011). Such findings have also been observed in developing
economies as well (e.g., Li & Lu, 2009; Ali, Peerlings, & Zhang, 2014), although Ali and
colleagues (2014) attribute this vertical disintegration to inefficient capital markets.
Nevertheless, employing an instrumental variable approach, Li and Lu (2009) established
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causality for vertical disintegration by geographic concentration of industrial activity, attributing
their findings to both cost reduction concerns and mitigation of opportunistic behaviors. This is
despite China, the setting of that study, having a relatively low degree of industrial concentration
when compared to other settings that are frequently employed in the study of industrial clusters
(Lu & Tao, 2009).
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3. METHODOLOGY

Sample
Our sample consists of 135 public and private firms in the semiconductor industry that
are based in the United States. The semiconductor industry offers numerous advantages that
make it well-suited for the present study. First, semiconductors have been the setting of prior
research in both corporate governance (e.g., Boeker & Goodstien, 1993; Boyd, 1995; Krause,
Filatotchev, & Bruton, 2016) and agglomeration economies (e.g., Almeida & Kogut, 1999;
Cheyre, Klepper, & Veloso, 2015; McCann, Reuer, & Lahiri, 2016). Second, as noted by Phene
and Almeida (2008), the semiconductor industry carries several benefits for studies pertaining to
innovation. Specifically, since the United States is a major market, design, and manufacturing
hub for semiconductors, all major semiconductor companies utilize the United States’ system for
patenting. Finally, firms may opt to avoid patenting as a strategic choice, thereby limiting the
effectiveness of patents as an innovation measure. However, competitive factors within the
industry lead semiconductor firms to patent innovations frequently, and all semiconductor
companies of import have a large patent portfolio (Almeida, 1996).
Our sample was assembled from multiple data sources. First, data related to the board of
directors and CEOs were drawn from Standard & Poor’s ExecuComp database and crosschecked with DEF-14A proxy statements filed with the SEC where possible, as well as LinkedIn
and Crunchbase. Next, patent data were gleaned from the WRDS patent database. Finally,
information regarding the SIC codes in which the firms were active as well as their research and
development intensity were gathered from the Reuters ThompsonOne Financial Database.
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Analytical Technique
We utilize qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) in the present study. Specifically, we
use fuzzy set QCA (fsQCA), a QCA variant which allows the researcher to assign graduated
membership levels to variables in sets. This technique has increasingly been adopted by
corporate governance researchers (Misangyi & Acharya, 2014; Lewellyn & Fainshmidt, 2017;
Mellewigt, Hoetker, & Luetkewitte, 2018) and agglomeration scholars (e.g., Speldekamp,
Knoben, & Saka-Helmhout, 2020) as it offers several unique advantages over traditional
methodological approaches.
First, it allows the researcher to assess causal asymmetry, or the idea that factors which
lead to the outcome variable will not necessarily lead to its absence. This is somewhat intuitive
as successes are not always mirror images of failure in a causal sense. Second, fsQCA permits
examination of equifinal outcomes. If asked to add two integers to obtain a value of four, you
might provide an answer of two plus two, three plus one, or zero plus four. Similarly, there may
be multiple legitimate pathways towards reaching a high-performance outcome. Finally,
conjunctural causation effects can be examined within these outcomes. An example of this
would be driving a car: One presses the accelerator pedal to travel forwards and the brake pedal
to stop but pressing both will not necessarily result in a medium rate of speed. In the same way,
causal conditions that have a particular impact on an outcome when used on an individual basis
will not necessarily combine in like fashion. The use of fsQCA allows us to examine these
effects.
Measurement and Calibration of Conditions
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We utilized one outcome condition to examine innovation quantity and five causal
conditions - two which represent agency costs, two which represent board-level factors which
should mitigate them, and an agglomeration measure. We operationalized innovation quantity as
a simple count of the number of patents applied for and granted to an assignee firm over a
specific time period (the year 2013, in our case) following prior research (e.g., DeCarolis &
Deeds, 1999; Corredoira & Rosenkopf, 2010).
The agency cost conditions were operationalized in a manner consistent with prior
literature. R&D Intensity was calculated as the ratio of research and development spending to
the organization’s total annual sales (e.g., Haleblian, McNamara, Kolev, & Dykes, 2012; Certo,
Withers, & Semadeni, 2017). Similarly, Diversification was a simple count of the quantity of 4digit SIC codes in which a firm was active over the sample period (Villalonga, 2004; Choi,
Menon, & Tabakovic, 2021).
For the conditions concerning the board of directors, we obtained data regarding CEO
duality and board independence. CEO Duality was operationalized as a dummy variable
following many prior cross-sectional studies (as noted in a meta-analytic study by Garcia-Meca
& Sanchez-Ballesta, 2009). Board Independence was also operationalized with a common
measure in governance literature, i.e., a ratio of outside to total directors (e.g., Westphal &
Graebner, 2010; Witt, Fainshmidt, & Aguilera, 2021).
As discussed in previous studies, agglomeration economies have been operationalized in
a variety of ways which carry distinct advantages (McCann & Folta, 2008). We opted to utilize
the percentage of our sample that was active in a specific metropolitan statistical area (MSA)
(Folta et al., 2006; McCann & Folta, 2011) to operationalize Agglomeration as agglomeration
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effects tend to dissipate at more distant levels (Jaffe, Trajtenburg, & Henderson, 1993). We used
firm zip codes in conjunction with crosswalk files from the US Department of Housing and
Urban Development to assign sample firms to an MSA (2021).
Before an fsQCA analysis is performed, the data must be calibrated. This entails
assigning set membership scores for each causal condition (see Ragin, 2008 for an in-depth
discussion). This is an advantage of fuzzy-set QCA; while crisp-set analyses can only examine
full members (i.e., those with a score of 1) or non-members (i.e., those with a score of 0) of a set,
fuzzy set analyses allow the researcher to assign thresholds in between these extremes, reflecting
potential ambiguity regarding set membership. Calibration thresholds can be based on theory or
previous findings (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009), or, when those factors provide little guidance, can be
assigned based on sample-specific measures such as quartile splits (Crilly, 2010; Judge,
Fainshmidt, & Brown, 2014).

We utilized quartile splits in our analysis. Specifically, we used

fsQCA 3.1’s calibration algorithm to split firms into full set membership (i.e., the 75th
percentile), maximum ambiguity in membership (i.e., the 50th percentile), and full nonmembership (i.e., the 25th percentile) following prior research (e.g., Mallon, Lanivich, &
Klinger, 2018). We altered variables which fell precisely at .5 by coding them with a value of
.499 in order to prevent them from being dropped during the analysis (Crilly, Zollo, & Hansen,
2012; Lewellyn & Fainshmidt, 2017).
Data Analysis
Necessity Analysis. A necessary condition in QCA is one that is required in order for the
outcome to be reached (Rihoux & Ragin, 2009), and it is appropriate to check for the necessity
of each individual variable before running the analysis (Ragin, 2009). A condition that has a
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consistency value between .9 and .99 is deemed to be almost always necessary, while a condition
that has a consistency value of 1 would be considered to be always necessary (Schneider,
Schulze-Bentrop, & Paunescu, 2010). Given that none of our conditions were within this range,
they were retained for the subsequent QCA analysis. Table 1 shows the results of our necessity
analysis, confirming that no conditions were necessary for the presence (or absence) of high
innovation quantity.
-----------------------------Insert Table 1 about here
-----------------------------Frequency Threshold. The fsQCA 3.1 program creates a truth table which consists of all
of the combinations of causal conditions which are logically possible in order to associate
configurations of agency costs and controls which correspond to high (and low) levels of
innovation quantity. The total ways in which this truth table can be arranged is represented by
2k, with k representing the quantity of causal conditions employed within the analysis. This
being the case, there are 32 configurations which are possible (in theory) in our analysis. We
further narrowed the truth table by assigning a frequency threshold of three observations at
minimum. That is, a minimum of three firms had to be assigned to a particular configuration in
order for the configuration to be incorporated into our analysis (Garcia-Castro, Aguilera, &
Arino, 2013; Lewellyn & Fainshmidt, 2017). This enhances the analysis by removing
configurations which rarely occur, essentially acting as a robustness measure. In establishing a
frequency threshold, it is critical that relatively few observations be eliminated. Specifically, the
base level recommended is 75 percent of a sample’s observations (Ragin, 2008). After setting
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our threshold, 86 percent of the firms in our sample remained, well exceeding the recommended
minimum.
Consistency Values. The next step in our analytical procedure involved employing
consistency values in order to determine whether any of the remaining configurations indicated a
high level of innovation quantity. Consistency values are displayed as a matter of degree, with a
higher consistency value indicating greater commonality between membership in the
configuration and membership in the outcome of interest (Ragin, 2008). Consistent with prior
literature, we assigned a consistency cutoff of 0.80 for high levels of our outcome of interest
(i.e., innovation quantity) (e.g., Speldekamp et al., 2020). The fsQCA 3.1 software subsequently
minimized the configurations with the Quine-McCluskey algorithm, producing an array of
configurations which were sufficient for high levels of innovation quantity. These consistency
values were complemented with a proportional reduction in inconsistency (PRI) value of greater
than .70. The PRI helps to avoid combinations of attributes which are present in both the desired
outcome as well as its absence (Greckhamer, 2016).
We repeated the frequency and consistency procedures outlined above, setting the
outcome condition as the negation of high innovation quantity in order to determine which
configurations would consistently lead to low levels of innovation quantity. This produced no
configurations, however. In order to obtain our results for low innovation quantity, it was
necessary to lower the frequency threshold to 1 and the consistency threshold to the minimum
recommended level of .75 (Ragin, 2008).

3.1 RESULTS
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A correlation matrix containing descriptive statistics for our causal and outcome
conditions is displayed in Table 2, which was calculated using raw (i.e., pre-calibrated) data.
The significant and negative correlation between outside directors and R&D intensity is
consistent with the findings of prior research (e.g., Baysinger, Kosnik, & Turk, 1991). This is in
alignment with our theorizing as the joint effects of these conditions should affect outcomes
depending upon their configuration.
-----------------------------Insert Table 2 about here
-----------------------------Table 3 demonstrates the configurations of causal conditions that our analysis indicates
are sufficient for producing both high and low levels of innovation quantity. Consistent with
prior governance research that has employed fsQCA, we report the complex solution rather than
the intermediate and/or parsimonious ones (Garcia-Castro et al., 2013; Jackson & Ni, 2013;
Lewellyn & Fainshmidt, 2017). This made sense in our case as incorporating the intermediate
and/or parsimonious solutions into our results involves employing counterfactuals - that is,
“theory-guided hunches” regarding the manner in which causal conditions will affect the
outcome (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 168). Given the aforementioned uncertainty
regarding the ways in which our causal conditions might consistently produce high or low
innovation quantity, we chose to have the findings represent the data to the extent possible rather
than employing assumptions that might be considered subjective.
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-----------------------------Insert Table 3 about here
-----------------------------These results show three total configurations of causal conditions; two of those lead to
high innovation quantity, while one leads to the negation of high innovation quantity. In the first
configuration, we observe firms with high R&D intensity, high board independence, high
degrees of agglomeration, and low levels of diversification achieving high innovation quantity.
CEO duality is blank, indicating that some firms in this configuration utilized dual leadership
structures, while others did not. For the second configuration, firms with high R&D intensity,
high diversification, and CEO duality consistently achieved high innovation quantity. These
firms were relatively low in terms of their board independence and degree of industrial
agglomeration. In the final configuration, in which the outcome condition was set to the
negation of innovation quantity, we observe a high degree of diversification, but a low degree of
all other causal conditions.
Also displayed are the coverage and consistency values calculated by the fsQCA software
for both each configuration as well as the overarching solution.

Coverage denotes the amount

of the outcome that is explained by each configuration (and all configurations, at the solution
level), while consistency scores illustrate the degree to which a configuration results in an
outcome (and again, all configurations at the solution level). See Ragin (2006) and Woolside
(2013) for a thorough explanation of both coverage and consistency values. Within coverage,
fsQCA calculates both raw and unique coverage values. The raw coverage specifies the
proportion of cases which contain both that configuration and the outcome (Ragin, 2008), while
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the unique coverage denotes the coverage by a specific path (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012).
All of these fall in acceptable ranges, and each configuration helps to explain organizational
innovation since the unique coverage values are greater than zero (Ragin, 2008).
Robustness Analyses. We followed best practices as outlined by prior research in testing
to see whether different consistency thresholds would merit a substantively dissimilar
interpretation of our results (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). Specifically, we chose a higher
consistency threshold of 0.84 to overcome an observed lacuna in the truth table (Crilly, 2010;
Lewellyn & Fainshmidt, 2017). With this increase in threshold, configuration 2 is removed from
the solution set. Solution-level coverage dropped to 0.29, while the solution-level consistency
increased slightly to 0.87. This alteration is expected and consistent with the results reported in
Table 3. Since the negation of our outcome variable only produced one configuration at
minimum recommended values, this result should be interpreted with caution.
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4. DISCUSSION

Although large literatures in corporate governance (e.g., Wu, 2008; Balsmeier,
Buchwald, & Stiebale, 2014; Zhang, Chen, & Feng, 2014) and geographic economics (e.g., Jaffe
et al., 1993; Mathias et al., 2020) have explored innovation, to our knowledge, the two have not
been previously joined in an effort to understand how corporate governance might be
differentially affected by the firm’s presence in a Marshallian externality. Our study contributes
to these literatures by demonstrating that firm location relative to competitors has direct
implications for the efficaciousness of various board characteristics as they pertain to firm
outcomes, and provides some empirical examples as to how.
In keeping with recommended practices for configurational theorizing, we examine each
configuration for overarching themes (Furnari, Crilly, Misangyi, Greckhamer, Fiss, & Aguilera,
2021). The first configuration in Table 3 is largely consistent with an agency perspective for
agglomerated firms, being characterized by a preponderance of outside directors and limited
diversification (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983). It may be the case that
although clustered firms have fewer monitoring needs due to factors such as predictability in
non-opportunistic behavior (Iammarino & McCann, 2006), there is a “crowding out” effect
where the efforts spent in developing trust with local firms might be better directed towards
innovation (Molina-Morales & Martinez-Fernandez, 2009).
The exception to the above is that while CEO duality is thought to increase agency costs
(e.g., Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994), our results indicate that within configuration 1 it was
present for some firms and absent for others. Following prior research, we opted to examine the
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cases within the solution set of the analysis (Greckhamer, Furnari, Fiss, & Aguilera, 2018). Of
the firms with dual CEOs in configuration 1, two were led by founder CEOs, which should face
reduced agency costs (Boivie, Lange, McDonald, & Westphal, 2011); yet, two others rejoined
the CEO and chair roles after a succession event, which some evidence suggests should increase
agency problems (Quigley & Hambrick, 2012). The explanation may lie elsewhere. For
example, CEO duality has been shown to positively moderate the relationship between
innovative knowledge assets (such as patents) and firm performance (He & Wang, 2014), and
has been shown to be substituted for by other governance mechanisms in the context of firm
performance (Misangyi & Acharya, 2014).
The second configuration consists of firms which are relatively more geographically
remote and runs counter to what we would expect from an agentic view. Despite the higher
agency cost of being diversified, these firms utilize a dual CEO and a relatively high percentage
of inside directors to achieve high innovation quantity. This finding is consistent with studies
that have argued and found that agglomerated firms may face greater appropriation concerns
from proximate competitors (e.g., Shaver & Flyer, 2000; Devarakonda et al., 2018).
While it is conceivable that geographic remoteness means a reduced need for governance
mechanisms designed with oversight in mind, an alternative interpretation might be that for
diversified firms, insiders’ firm-specific knowledge is more beneficial (e.g., Raheja, 2005). If
that is the case, we should observe diversified firms with more inside directors as being
consistently innovative regardless of the degree of industrial agglomeration that is present. In
order to test this argument, we split the sample, deleting all cases with an agglomeration value
below .5 (i.e., those cases which were more “outside” than “inside” of agglomerated sets). This
result is presented in Appendix A. The new sample consists of 64 observations and the results
69

70

presented possess a frequency threshold of 1. Although a variety of configurations were
consistently successful at achieving innovation quantity, all of them included outside directors,
even for diversified firms.
There is also a normative argument to be made in both configurations (e.g., DiMaggio &
Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995) in that the adoption of CEO duality and a relatively high level of
outside directors might simply reflect pressures for mimetic isomorphism moreso than an effort
towards effective governance but given the lack of conformity among firms in our sample, the
evidence indicates that this is not the case. For example, in configuration 1, only 11 firms out of
the 45 within the same agglomeration were present in the solution set, indicating a lack of
isomorphism among the cluster more generally. Similarly, the low coverage value for
configuration 2 indicates that even if this were a widespread norm within the industry among
diversified, remote firms, this specific combination of causal conditions was rarely employed,
which implies the absence of isomorphism. Since under- or over-conformity to corporate
governance norms have been argued to affect firm outcomes at the national (Aguilera, Terjesen,
& Judge, 2018) and global (Witt. Fainshmidt, & Aguilera, 2021) levels, it may be the case that
norms are less likely to be observed among highly innovative firms. Little is known about
differential responses to normative pressures between agglomerated and nonagglomerated firms,
although some exploratory work has been done (e.g., Tan, Shao, & Li, 2013).
Our third configuration demonstrates that for firms which consistently reached the
negation of innovation quantity. In other words, these firms consistently failed to produce a
relatively high level of innovation output. Firms in configuration 3 exhibited a high degree of
diversification but a low degree of all other qualities. Among other things, this means that firms
which do not invest heavily in R&D might not be able to compensate in terms of their innovative
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output with scope economies, as some previous studies suggest (e.g., Baysinger & Hoskisson,
1989; Alonso-Borrego & Forcadell, 2010).
One limitation of our study is the cross-sectional nature of QCA. Since prior research
indicates that firms may go through “phases” of exploratory and exploitative innovation
(Mudambi, Swift, & Hannigan, 2015), it may be the case that firms which we found to be highly
innovative in one year were not consistently highly innovative beyond the study period.
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5. CONCLUSION

This study examined the effect of Marshallian externalities on the adoption of governance
structures. Our results indicated that agglomerated firms tended to benefit from the adoption of
agency-based thinking in terms of innovation. At the same time, non-agglomerated firms tended
to benefit from the opposite. To theory, our study contributes the idea that economic geography
is a central concern in disentangling the effects of the adoption of governance mechanisms. For
firms that were not successful in producing innovations in a significant quantity, our data
provides some evidence that R&D spending cannot be substituted for in respect to producing
innovation, a non-obvious finding given some prior research on the topic (e.g., Baysinger &
Hoskisson, 1989; Alonso-Borrego & Forcadell, 2010). Agglomeration policy is a frequent topic
of scholarly discussion (see Mathias et al., 2020 for a recent meta-analytic review) and our
results indicate that corporate governance policymakers might profitably incorporate
agglomeration economies into their decisionmaking. Corporate governance research has often
benefited from a fusion of extant theoretical perspectives (e.g., Hillman & Dalziel, 2003); the
addition of agglomeration theory to the discourse provides exciting possibilities for future work.
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Table 1.1 Multiple Directorships Literature

Subject Examined in Study

Positive or Insignificant
Influence

Negative or Curvilinear
Influence

Monitoring of the Board of
Directors

Current industry associations
equal better monitoring (Chou
& Feng, 2019); reputational
concerns should lead to
superior monitoring (Fama &
Jensen, 1983); superior
monitoring when tied to
similar firms (Carpenter &
Westphal, 2001) positive
effects (Mendez, Pathan, &
Garcia, 2015; Mendez, Garcia,
& Pathan, 2017); reduces
agency cost (Katti & Raithatha
2018); Better director quality
in terms of being older, more
qualified, more specialized
backgrounds (Viviers & MansKemp, 2019)

Poor monitoring (Core,
Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999;
Shivdasani & Yermack, 1999;
Fich and Shivdasani, 2006;
Jiraporn, Kim, & Davidson,
2008; Devos, Prevost, &
Puthenpurackal, 2008;
Renneboog & Zhao, 2011;
Mendez, Pathan, & Garcia,
2015; Brown, Dai, & Zur,
2019); reduce likelihood of
firing an underperforming CEO
(Handschumacher, Behrmann,
Ceschinski, & Sassen, 2019);
higher shareholder
dissatisfaction with monitoring
(Hillman, Shropshire, Certo,
Dalton, & Dalton, 2011);
curvilinear relationship with
monitoring (Hashim &
Rahman, 2011); insured
directors are more likely to be
busy, and their insurance also
increases their propensity for
moral hazard (Jia & Tang,
2018)

Acquisitions

Better acquisitions (Chou &
Feng, 2019); similar acquisition
behavior (Haunschild, 1993);
More valuable acquisitionrelated information than other
sources (Haunschild &
Beckman, 1998)

Higher diversification discount
(Jiraporn, Kim, & Davidson,
2008); More unrelated
geographic/product
diversification when directors
tied to other industries (Chen,
Dyball, & Wright, 2009);
curvilinear relationship (Ahn,
Jiraporn, & Kim, 2010)

CEO/Managerial
Compensation

CEO compensation (reducing
opportunism therein) (Cherry

CEO compensation overly high
(Core, Holthausen, & Larcker,
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& Gatchev, 2019); higher payperformance and pay-risk
sensitivity (Pathan, Wong, &
Benson, 2019); higher payperformance sensitivity
(Handschumacher, Behrmann,
Ceschinski, & Sassen, 2019)
lower compensation (Mendez,
Pathan, & Garcia, 2015;
Mendez, Garcia, & Pathan,
2017); compensation more
equity-based due to limited
time for monitoring (Ferris,
Liao, & Tamm, 2018)

1999); higher pay and lower
equity compensation (Pathan,
Wong, & Benson, 2019);
overcompensation of mgmt
(Andres, van den Bongard, &
Lehmann, 2013;
Handschumacher, Behrmann,
Ceschinski, & Sassen, 2019);
CEO compensation higher
(Hallock, 1997)

Board Meeting Attendance

No difference in meeting
attendance (Harris & Shimizu,
2004; Viviers & Mans-Kemp,
2019)

Reduced meeting attendance
(Jiraporn, Davidson, DaDalt, &
Ning, 2009; Chiranga, Chiwira,
Sarker, & Sarker, 2014)

Firm Performance

Positive firm performance
(Ferris, Jagannathan, &
Pritchard, 2003; Ong, Wan, &
Ong, 2003; Pombo & Gutierrez,
2011; Field, Lowry, &
Mkrtchyan, 2013; Larcker, So,
& Wang, 2013; Li, Tian, & Yan,
2013; Omer, Shelley, & Tice,
2014; Blanco-Alcantara, DiezEsteban, & Romero-Merino,
2019 (when tied to related
industries)); Positive long-term
performance (Geletkanycz &
Boyd, 2011); no influence
(Fligstein & Brantley, 1992)

Firm value negative effect
(Okazaki, Sawada, &
Yokoyama, 2005; Santos, da
Silveira, & Barros, 2012;
Andres, van den Bongard, &
Lehmann, 2013; Brown, Dai, &
Zur, 2019), higher likelihood of
firm failure (Susi & Lukason,
2019); poor performance
(Core, Holthausen, & Larcker,
1999; Jiraporn, Kim, &
Davidson, 2008; Fich &
Shivdasani, 2006; Niu &
Berberich, 2015)

Advisory and Resource
Provision Roles

Advisory role emphasized
(Chen, 2008); greater
likelihood of receiving private
equity offers (Stuart & Yim
2010); busy directors help in
re-emerging from bankruptcy
when they have financial

Superior strategic advising
occurs when multiple
directorships are destroyed via
acquisitions (Brown, Dai, &
Zur, 2019)
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connections (Arora, 2018)
Accounting Measures

No effect on voluntary
disclosures (Haniffa & Cooke,
2002); No relationship
between multiple directorships
and fraud investigations
(Schnake & Williams, 2008);
Positive association with firm
credit rating (Benson, Iyer,
Kemper, & Zhao, 2018)

Curvilinear relationship with
financial reporting quality
(Zheng, 2008); Negative
relationship with corporate
internet reporting (Abdelsalam
& Street, 2007); increase
earnings management (Sarkar
& Sarkar, 2009); lead to
increased incidence of fraud
(Beasley, 1996); poor reporting
quality and greater earnings
management (Ferris & Liao,
2019)

CSR

Fast-paced CSR activities
benefit from interlocks (AlDah, 2019)

Negatively moderate the
relationship between CSR and
firm performance (Su &
Sauerwald, 2018)
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TABLE 1.2 Pairwise correlations
Variables
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(1) Acquisition Success
1.000
(2) Acquirer Performance
0.029 1.000
(3) Acquirer Debt
-0.186 0.095 1.000
(4) Acquirer Diversification
0.004 -0.002 -0.089 1.000
(5) Recent Acquisitions
-0.276 0.209 0.247 -0.027
(6) Size Ratio
-0.092 -0.094 -0.063 0.048
(7) Deal Value
0.022 0.062 0.012 0.126
(8) Target Performance
-0.074 0.117 0.045 0.065
(9) Board Size
0.001 0.201 0.216 0.297
(10) Geographic Distance
-0.161 0.132 -0.140 0.028
(11) Multiple Directorships
0.096 0.281 0.248 -0.085

(5)

(6)

1.000
0.097 1.000
0.222 0.300
0.114 0.034
0.089 -0.026
0.111 0.001
0.017 -0.023
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(7)

(8)

(9)

(10)

(11)

1.000
0.094 1.000
0.177 0.176 1.000
0.096 -0.032 -0.051 1.000
0.068 0.032 0.603 -0.102

1.000

86

TABLE 1.3 REGRESSION ANALYSES
VARIABLES
Recent Acquisitions
Acquirer Diversification
Acquirer Debt
Acquirer Performance
Size Ratio
Board Size
Target Performance
Deal Value

(1)
Model 1

(2)
Model 2

(3)
Model 3

(4)
Model 4

(5)
Model 5

(6)
Model 6

(6)
Margins

-0.446***
(0.101)
-0.0283
(0.102)
-0.000335**
(0.000148)
1.092
(1.325)
-1.236**
(0.516)
0.0465
(0.124)
-0.00292
(0.00696)
8.00e-05***
(1.90e-05)

-0.444***
(0.101)
-0.0212
(0.100)
-0.000358**
(0.000154)
1.640
(1.268)
-1.079**
(0.438)
0.0346
(0.117)
-0.00390
(0.00652)
8.76e-05***
(1.68e-05)
-0.166**
(0.0837)

-0.423***
(0.108)
0.0122
(0.0963)
-0.000354**
(0.000151)
0.696
(1.253)
-1.306**
(0.559)
-0.0586
(0.119)
-0.00203
(0.00703)
8.08e-05***
(1.81e-05)

-0.369***
(0.111)
-0.00629
(0.0874)
-0.000353**
(0.000153)
1.461
(1.361)
-1.436**
(0.657)
-0.0653
(0.116)
-0.00219
(0.00547)
9.48e-05***
(1.96e-05)
-0.519***
(0.188)
-0.202
(0.189)
0.0572**
(0.0266)

-1.277***
(0.403)
0.0263
(0.119)
-0.000367***
(0.000142)
1.707
(1.443)
-0.985*
(0.591)
-0.123
(0.138)
-0.00104
(0.00669)
9.13e-05***
(1.71e-05)
-0.129
(0.0951)
-0.0227
(0.0684)

-.2283328

0.141**

-1.331***
(0.442)
-0.00259
(0.115)
-0.000352***
(0.000134)
2.030
(1.748)
-1.223
(0.775)
-0.133
(0.139)
0.000200
(0.00556)
9.91e-05***
(1.94e-05)
-0.530***
(0.195)
-0.390**
(0.187)
0.0638**
(0.0259)
0.156**

Geographic Distance
Multiple Directorships

0.123*
(0.0725)

Geog. Dist.*Mult. Directorships
Mult. Directorships*Recent
Acquisitions
Constant

Observations

-0.0140
(0.918)

0.952
(1.068)

0.119
(0.903)

3.023**
(1.455)

(0.0644)
2.146**
(1.017)

(0.0700)
4.527***
(1.512)
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97

97
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-.0004446
-.0000605
.3481609
-.2097708
-.0227824
.0000343
.000017
-.0909041
-.0668172
.0109489
.0268228

.1193926
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Table 2.1
Analysis of necessary conditions
Patents

Negation of Patents

Condition
tested

Consistency

Coverage

R&D Intensity

0.621012

0.622894

0.460924

0.466850

Diversification

0.458025

0.562799

0.450382

0.558830

CEO Duality

0.358607

0.523652

0.323048

0.476348

Board
Independence

0.588975

0.611884

0.468428

0.491416

Agglomeration

0.664096

0.670999

0.455734

0.464982
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Consistency Coverage

88

Table 2.2
Correlation table
Mean
119.28

SD
612.00

1

R&D Intensity

43.37

172.15

-0.03

3

Diversification

2.87

1.68

-0.13

-0.06

4

CEO Duality

0.34

0.48

0.09

-0.11

-0.01

5

Board Independence

0.75

0.13

0.10

-0.33

-0.09

0.01

6

Agglomeration

0.12

0.12

-0.01

-0.04

0.02

-0.02

1

Innovation Quantity

2

N = 135

88

2

3

4

5

0.09
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TABLE 2.3:
Results from Truth Table Analysis

Outcome
Attribute

Negation of
Patents Awarded

Patents Awarded
P1

P2

P3

R&D Intensity

●

●

Ø

Diversification

Ø

●

●

●

Ø

CEO Duality
Board Independence

●

Ø

Ø

Agglomeration

●

Ø

Ø

Raw Coverage

0.29

0.05

0.13

Unique Coverage

0.05

0.03

0.13

Consistency

0.88

0.81

0.86

Solution Coverage

.33
.86

Solution Consistency

89

.13
.86
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TABLE 2.4, Appendix A:
Results from Truth Table Analysis

Outcome
Attribute
R&D Intensity

Patents Awarded
P1

P2

P3

●

Ø

●

Diversification

Ø

CEO Duality

●

Ø

Board Independence

●

●

●

Raw Coverage

0.10

0.21

0.38

Unique Coverage

0.07

0.09

0.22

Consistency

0.83

0.83

0.85

Solution Coverage

.54
.81

Solution Consistency
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